A bibliography of citizenship: theories and aspects of the modern *citoyen*

Christina M. Akrivopoulou¹

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Abstract:
The present paper is offering a short account of citizenship, its history, its constitution and its main theoretical approaches. It is divided in four principal sections. The first, examines the two main theories of citizenship in their historical and normative context, thus the republican and liberal approach of citizenship as they were formed in the ancient Greek and Roman tradition, as well as in their current feminist critic. The second part focuses in the analyses of what seems up until now to be the most influential work on citizenship, the essay of the British sociologist, Thomas Humphrey Marshall ‘Citizenship and Social class’, which was published in 1950 and since then it is considered to be the stepping stone of the international literature on citizenship. The third part presents the ‘constitution’ of citizenship, the elements of which the notion of citizen is crafted, thus membership in a certain political community, rights and the ability of democratic participation. Finally, the last part examines the modern apprehension of citizenship, its supranational dynamic, its ability to act as a means of integration and coercion in the modern liberal democracies, while theories of pluralism, cosmopolitanism and post-nationalism are taken into account. Instead of conclusions, the paper is closing with a short post-script concerning the fallacies and prospects of a European citizenship.

Key words: Pluralism, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, citizenship, republicanism, liberalism, inclusion, exclusion.

I. Citizenship: apprehensions, dimensions and the value of the concept

Citizenship is an old and at the same time relatively new concept. Formed in the city states of Ancient Greece, evolved from the Roman Empire era to the modern nation-states where it grew as synonymous to the notions of membership, democratic

¹ PhD in Constitutional Law, Attorney at Law, Adjunct Lecturer of Democritus University of Thrace, Greece and Hellenic Open University, Post-doctoral Researcher of the Greek Scholarships Foundation.
agency and rights, it came to the focus of theoretical attention especially during the ‘90s\(^2\). Primarily, citizenship was attached to political participation in public offices and electing procedures, as voting and public demonstrations. Nowadays, it is considered to be a broad concept that embraces the totality of interests that personal and public relations forge in a certain political community. Its immense value lies in its comprehensive concept as well as in its rare character. Democratic citizenship shields via the political autonomy that it guarantees, also the collective, social and personal autonomy of the individual. Moreover, though valued as a concept, citizenship is a rare reality. Statistics show that apathy and absence in political participation is becoming the rule rather than the exemption, with the U.S.A. democracy, becoming the most glaring paradigm. Additionally, the modern nation states are hosting nowadays a respected number of non-citizens, legal or illegal immigrants. As far as they are concerned, citizenship is a non-right, a form of exclusion, of inequality and discrimination\(^3\).

Today, the vast waves of migration in Europe and America and the consequences of the world globalization are challenging our apprehensions of citizenship. Traditionally, the modern understanding of citizenship was forged in the process of state building and attached to the notion of nationality. Nationality defined citizenship by becoming the sociological and normative basis of identity and solidarity between the members of a political community. Nevertheless, globalization and immigration have currently reattached this close connection by challenging the traditional bond between nation and state building. Ethnicity and nationality are becoming rarer in the contemporary liberal democracies which more and more tend to be internally diverse and multicultural. At the same time, the globalization process is pressuring the territorial dimension of the nation-state, thus eroding the political empowerment and the social and civil rights of their citizens. Under these novel circumstances, new supranational apprehensions of citizenship are born\(^4\), such as the notion of European citizenship guaranteed by the Maastricht Treaty, or the cosmopolitan approach proposed by the neo-Kantian theorists\(^5\).


In this frame, the present paper will offer a short theoretical presentation of the notion of citizenship; its history, its constitution and its main theoretical approaches. The paper is divided in four principal sections. The first, examines the two main theories of citizenship in their historical and normative context, thus the republican and liberal approach of citizenship as they were formed in the ancient Greek and Roman tradition, as well as in their current feminist critic. The second part focuses in the analyses of what seems up until now to be the most influential work on citizenship, the work of the British sociologist, Thomas Humphrey Marshall ‘Citizenship and Social class’ which was published in 1950 and since then it is considered to be the stepping stone of the literature on citizenship. The third part presents the ‘constitution’ of citizenship, the elements of which the notion of citizen is crafted, thus membership in a certain political community, rights and the ability of democratic participation. Finally, the last part examines the modern apprehensions of citizenship, its supranational dynamic, its ability to act as a means of integration and coercion in the modern liberal democracies and the theories of pluralism, cosmopolitanism and post-nationalism are taken into account. Instead of conclusions, the paper is closing with a short post-script concerning the fallacies and prospects of a European citizenship.

II. Historic models, approaches and theories of citizenship

According to Richard Bellamy there is a dual taxonomy of theories of citizenship\(^6\). Thus, in general citizenship theories can be considered as normative and as empirical. Their common bond is that they both are based in one or another way in a historical understanding of the concept of citizenship. The first category is looking back in past historical models of citizenship in order to craft *ideal types* of what could mean to be a truly virtuous citizen. Those models provide a normative account of the rights and duties that the modern citizens bear, compare its current status with old models of citizenship, criticize and contrast between them and try to underline the advantages and disadvantages between old and new accounts of citizenship\(^7\). The second, the empirical category is also integrating normative elements but its main focus is in empirical facts, thus the background social, economic and political reasons causing the transfigurations of the concept of citizenship\(^8\). The normative elements

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justify the reshaping or evolution of the understanding of citizenship but among other empirical factors. Their main difference is that the empirical theories may describe ideal types of citizenship but they do not understand it as an ideal itself. Whereas the first category is more common in philosophy and law theoretical approaches of citizenship, the second one seems to be the case in social and political sciences.

The two dominant models of citizenship are considered to be in theory the republican and the liberal approach. Both are of normative nature and are based on historical perspectives. In the republican approach, the citizen is empowered and thus identified not as a subject of authority but as its bearer, as ruler of his self. The republican approach is originated in the polis-citizenship, as it was developed in the work of Aristotle in the Ancient Athens of the 5th b.c. century along with its roman successor, the Republican Rome. The republican model of citizenship is characterized by the citizens’ equal participation in the political institutions. Along with Aristotle, the works of Tacitus and Cicero as well as of Machiavelli and Rousseau are part of the republican citizenship tradition. Indeed the very notion of ‘self-rule’ as elaborated in the Aristotle perspective lies in the centre of Rousseau’s democratic-radical approach. In his work ‘Contrat Social’ is presented via the notion of general will which makes the people co-legislators and ultimately free under a law system legitimized by their own power and choice.

The republican approach is crafted in the model of Ancient Athens, based on a strict public-private division and on the exercise of political power by equal citizens, nevertheless, representing the minority of the population. Thus, citizenship was appointed only to males over twenty years old, born by both Athenians parents, owners of a household and able to engage in war. For this small in size political body, absolute equality in political participation was guaranteed via the system of lot. By lottery and by appointing short term of office in the political institutions the participation of all considered as Athenian citizens, was assured. Everyone was considered to be as ‘ruled’ and ‘ruler’. That was the meaning of the word democracy: the rule (κράτος) of people, demos (δῆμος). In this system, citizenship was a privilege and also an obligation, a public virtue and a sacrifice of one’s private life to a richer and substantially significant public life, signified by communication,

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free agency and grand acts. This model is considered to be until nowadays the ideal type of an active political citizenship, of the citizen as ‘political animal’ in Aristotle’s wording. Nevertheless, this system of citizenship especially in our days addresses small state communities.

Nevertheless, the republican approach is strongly criticized especially by the feminist theory in terms of being excluding and suppressing, especially for women, children, slaves and μέτοικοι (‘metics’ or immigrants). The feminist theory, after the ’70s has strongly criticized the absolute division between public and private that the republican model of citizenship is based on as unjust and unequal. Earlier, Hannah Arendt in one of her most influential books, ‘Vita Activa’, published in 1958 is emphasizing that the distinction between private and public in ancient Athens was indeed a division between οίκος (home-household) and πόλις (city). The first was the domain of necessity, where the human needs of everyday life and reproduction were served. There, patriarchyism and inequality were reigning. Instead, the second, the πόλις (city) was the ‘kingdom’ of equality and freedom. Under this division Arendt describes the exclusion from the political realm as ‘deprivation’, a state beyond inequality. For Arendt, the non-citizen person’s such as women, children, metics and slaves were living in a state of inexistency, since by not participating in the political sphere they could not be ‘seen’ or ‘heard’, thus they could not communicate with the others. In her turn Susan Okin has criticized the republican approach by observing that an optimum citizenship could not be based in bare and radical inequalities and that in fact totalitarianism was hidden under the veil of the Athenian democracy as far as the women, children, metics and slaves were concerned. Realistically, one could say that such a division was undermining even for the political sphere itself since the political realm seems unrealistic if functioning isolated by the natural and world of human life and of material things.

The republican approach is also dominant in the Roman Republican era. Its main difference lies in the fact that though in Ancient Athens citizenship was the basis of equality, in the Roman times is the result of the class struggle between the patricians (patricius) and the plebeians (plebius). Additionally, the people of Rome never acquired the same political power, since Senate (Senatus) a political body dominated by patricians was dominating the Roman Republic. According to the

Roman motto, *Senatus Populusque Romanus*, thus the Senate and the Roman people, the Roman citizens where regarded as co-rulers and not as the sole rulers of the Roman Republic\(^{17}\).

Nonetheless, it is the liberal approach which is strikingly traced in the Roman Empire era. During this historical period the expansion of the Empire lead to the acknowledgement of the Roman citizenship also to the submitted peoples (Greeks, Jews etc.). This transition transforms the very concept of citizenship attaching it with the appointment of a specific legal *status*, than of an active political participation in the political and law making. This state of citizenship, as Richard Bellamy points out, was called ‘civitas sine suffragio’\(^{18}\), thus citizenship deprived of the political right to vote. Under this rubric, citizen was the one who shared a community of law, was protected and obliged by it. Given that the Empire was not characterized by territorial barriers, the liberal origin of citizenship as legal identity, points out that is in fact a dynamic concept with the capacity to expand, to include and not exclude.

This legal kind of citizenship was deemed as a ‘secondary citizenship’ which did not in any sense implied any ability for political participation. The legal citizenship emphasized in the protection of a person’s private interests in property, material possessions and self-ownership, initially as freedom form slavery and afterwards as private autonomy. This understanding is the basis of the *social contract* theories developed in the 17\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) century mainly by Thomas Hobbes\(^ {19}\) and John Locke\(^ {20}\). The notion of *social contract* is in reality the notion of a fundamental superior law, justifying and binding at the same time the sovereign monarch power. Based on the mutual consent between the ruler and the ruled, the *social contract* is guaranteeing the common good by ensuring the private interest. Instead of claiming citizenship on the basis of ‘public virtue’, the equality of the people is based on the equal protection of the people’s individual interests under a ‘rule of law’ generated by and binding for a just sovereign. The social contract in Thomas Hobbes work is seen as the means to prevent the insecurity and the mutual harm that the individual’s can cause to each other due to their aggressive nature. Instead, in his most liberal work, John Locke emphasizes in the risks and endangerments that the state power can cause for the economic and contractual freedom, the property and the self-interest of the individual. For Locke, what is natural in the individual and the basis of a social contract between him and the sovereign is the protection of his self-ownership. Their

\(^{17}\) See Bellamy, p. 36.
\(^{18}\) See Bellamy, p. 39.
common root with the Roman liberal approach is their acknowledgement of the individual as a legal subject, equal under the law.

It is between the two ‘glorious’ revolutions, the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 and the birth of nation-state unified without identifying the liberal and the republican tradition. Thus, the American Constitution is addressed both to ‘We the People’, thus the citizens, as well as to the civil liberties of the individual. In the same line the French Declaration is referring to the rights of ‘Man’ and the ‘Citizen’, the public participating citizen and the private individual. The nation state becomes the perfect frame for the meeting of the liberal and republican tradition. Larger than the ancient Greek city-state and smaller that the empire it enables political participation –though in a much lesser direct and participatory form- under the ‘rule of law’ 21.

III. The Marshall’s approach on citizenship

Until today, the work of Thomas Humphrey Marshall ‘Citizenship and Social class’ published in 1950 22 is considered to be the most influential approach on the modern theories of democratic citizenship. With his work, Marshall introduced the concept of social rights, whilst he attached the notion of citizenship with ‘the right to have rights’, namely civic, political and social 23. On this approach he structured the concept of a ‘completed’ citizenship on the basis of the acquirement of rights belonging to all three categories. The work of the British sociologist is often twinned in theory with that of Stein Rokkan’s 24 who has twenty years later, based on Marshall’s theory, studied the shaping of citizen’s behaviors in his famous trans-European comparative research. From an empirical point of view Rokkan has succeeded in linking the concept of citizenship with that of democratic participation.

Though criticized, Marshall’s theoretical approach on citizenship is deemed as ‘structural’ for the making of the modern notion of citizenship. Marshall via the British example focused on citizenship as a product of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries in Europe. He accounted a three phase evolution which ends up in producing the notion of citizen. The first phase is attached to the making of the state as a result of

21 See Bellamy, pp. 43-44.
22 Following a lecture that he had given the previous year the famous essay was published and since then has become classic. T. H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class and other essays”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950.
European wars, revolutions, class conflicts and the decline of the European Empires. The second face is linked to the building of a pre-capitalist and capitalist society market based and grounded on the values of free commerce, competition and industry. The third phase is connected to nationalism, to the nation-state making as characterized by the ideological acceptance of ethnical diversity and the sense of co-belonging in a territorially defined public sphere. Under Marshall’s theory all these three phases represent the necessary preconditions for the making of citizenship in the European welfare nation states which construct the blueprint of his theory in the late 50’s.

The first phase, the creation of the state, is characterized by the concept of sovereignty and of the acknowledgment of people as subjects of the legitimate sovereign power. Sovereignty is built upon monarchy, an authority integrating all of the functions and powers in the soil territory of the state. This form of power is based upon the formation of a hierarchized bureaucracy which rationalizes the inaction of power and the structure of an undeveloped legal system. The most important element concerning the modern notion of citizenship apart the creation of the state, is the construction of the subject, that thought unequal and suppressed at this historical period is acknowledged as a legal entity of state obligations and duties and as the other pole of sovereignty25. Therefore, sovereign authority exists because it is enacted in a territorially defined number of people.

The second phase is characterized by a new focus. Sovereignty is shrinking in becoming the means to preserve, safeguard and expand the birth and evolution of European market based economies, signified by the free flow of products, commerce and the gradual development of industrial economy. Pre-capitalist societies acknowledge the need of securing and organizing this market-society by introducing laws that safeguard the property, by regulating the commerce with the adoption of currency and commonly accepted systems of measuring the goods. During this phase, the transportation system is evolving in order to accommodate freedom of economy and of commerce, whilst the class formation in society changes. The old feudalist system of strict hierarchy gives its position to new conceptions of status and to a new dominant class, the bourgeois. A new social class occupied with trade and industry and empowered by the acknowledgment of contractual freedom, as well as of the principles of equality and legality.

The third phase is that of the birth of nationalism and of creating the nation-state in an ideological and political level. According to Marshall the birth of nation-

state supports the regulation of the free economy, market based societies by promoting the sense of community, co-belonging and solidarity among its members. The idealization of states and their becoming as nations is construed via education, the integration of linguistic and cultural diversity through the acknowledgment of a common language and commonly rooted traditions. Wars, the creation of armies and of compulsory army servitude, which confirmed the nation-state territorialization and the continuing class struggles, were the background of the creation of nationalism and nation-state\(^\text{26}\). At this point, the notion of citizenship is attached to the linkage sense of community, identity and inclusion that the concept of nationality involves\(^\text{27}\).

According to Marshall the common thread combining these three phases, is the emergence of a market based, free commerce society, sharing a common ethos and bonds of solidarity, thus a national consciousness, regulated by a sovereign power against which the people could enact their right to legality, equality as well as the fundamental freedoms of commerce, contract and property. This common thread became the solid foundation of an active, democratic citizenship of shared economic interests and thus commonly protected rights against the state and of a value system which gradually formed a public sphere of political agency and communication (e.g. via the augmented social and political power of the free press)\(^\text{28}\).

While analyzing this transformations Marshall is also transfigurating the genesis of rights which is accompanying its historical phase. He describes rights as three generations, each one immediate successor and direct descended of the former. First come the civic, the individual rights in the period of 17\(^{th}\) to 19\(^{th}\) century. Those rights, as described in the works of Locke and Rousseau were attached to the upcoming bourgeois class of early-capitalists on which the market-based economies were based. The idea of individual rights was initially based on the freedom of conscience as taught through the protestant tradition and expanded in the economical freedoms, of contract, property, labor etc. The second generation involved the genesis of political rights (from the 18\(^{th}\) until the 20\(^{th}\) century) that initially enforced the political participation of property owners and then gradually expanded to the whole of male and female population by integrating social and political movements of political integration and inclusion by industrial workers and feminists\(^\text{29}\).

\(^{29}\) See V. Bader, “Citizenship and exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community and Justice, or What is wrong with communitarianism?”, *Political Theory*, 23 (2), 1995, p. 211.
The third generation of rights is in the epicenter of Marshall’s theory is the social one’s those construed with the social aspect of citizenship. Those rights are developed in the frame of a new economic and political model, that of the welfare state and address the social needs of the individual as the member of society, as the right of insurance, of medical care, of employment. Gradually, the rights belonging to this category embraced many and diverse facets of social life in order to protect in general the quality of life and the sense of social cohesion (e.g. right to public education, to pension, the right to environment etc.)30.

Under this understanding Marshall’s theory literally identified citizenship with the evolving acknowledgment of rights, civil, political and social. Thus, a complete citizenship should include all three categories in order to be as much as possible integrative and not exclusive. In Marshall’s blueprint the social rights represented the peak point of the notion of citizenship in the sense that they expanded the citizen’s notion via a substantive understanding of social equality. What seems to be the most significant point of his theory is the notion of citizenship as the frame of a constant claim for rights. Under this view, as Bellamy points out, ‘Although Marshall has sometimes been read as suggesting that there is an almost inevitable progression from civil to political to ever fuller social rights, this was not his view. He saw the acquisition of rights as a contingent and never-ending struggle’31.

Marshall’s theory of citizenship has severed strong criticism in its time. For example that it overlooks that citizenship in other paradigms apart from the British one32, which lies in the centre of Marshall’s theory were developed in a differentiated way. Often it is pointed out that in his theory he ‘integrates’ individual and social rights, not regarding their often tendency to clash (e.g. protection of property vs social rights)33. Nowadays, in many aspects the theory seems to be obsolete in the sense that it lacks the historical prospective of the recent transfiguration of the welfare state which caused its current ‘crisis’ as well as the pressures that globalization imposes on the nation-state notion and especially in the political aspects of citizenship, since in a supra-national environments the acquirement of full political agency seems utopic. In this background, the three aspects of the citizenship, as Marshall described them as a unity, are autonomized and loose their very common basis: the nation-state. Moreover, while the ‘legal’ aspect of citizenship seems to be celebrated in the new-

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30 See Bellamy, p. 46.
31 See Bellamy, p. 49.
globalized era, as more and more international treaties concerning the protection of human rights become are adopted, the political aspect of citizenship in this supranational environment becomes more and more blur. Thus, the people’s ability to participate in the international institutions to ask for their public scrutiny and accountability is dubious.

In this line of thought, the main argument of Marshall’s theory seems to be eroding: citizenship as a concept primarily based on the acknowledgement of civil rights is completed only when political and social rights are also guaranteed. Political rights are shielding the individual’s and group’s autonomy and enable the constant claim for the protection of individual rights. Social rights nurture the equal citizenships and augment the sense of solidarity and community that lacks in the modern, globalized era. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances the very point of the Marshall’s theory, stays alive. As the changing historical realities have triggered the struggles that expanded and culminated the meaning of citizenship from personal and group autonomy to social equality, one could truly believe that this era, the globalized, supra-national one is in fact fostering a new change, a new comprehensive and inclusive meaning of citizenship, not based in autonomy or equality but in the new terms and ethos that the cultural diversity of modern societies creates.

IV. The constitution of citizenship: membership, participation, rights and duties

A most classic definition of citizenship would describe the citizen as ‘a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership’\textsuperscript{34}. Under these broad terms the decisive elements of citizenship can be deemed as three: a) membership, b) rights and duties and c) political participation\textsuperscript{35}. The first and most characteristic element of citizenship, membership is paradoxically identified with the exclusive rather than the inclusive understanding of the notion. Thus, membership gives the citizen the specific benefit to participate in a political community where he/she can enjoy rights and freedoms that non-members of that community are excluded from. Therefore, even from the Ancient Athens, citizenship is acknowledgment as a privilege more than a common good. This exclusion can function as internal or external of a given political group. Internal exclusion to membership is based mostly on the discriminating properties of the individuals such


\textsuperscript{35} See Bellamy, (2008), p. 12.
as gender,\textsuperscript{36} social status or class, property, race and ethnicity.\textsuperscript{37} On the other hand, the external exclusions concern the immigrants and all those seeking for political asylum.\textsuperscript{38}

Membership lies in the very core of our perception of citizenship and it is attached with the notion of nation-state. Membership contains both sociological and normative elements. Above our feeling of solidarity, membership is the normative recognition of our co-belonging in a nation-state and of accepting as legitimate the political power and the laws enacted therein. Closely connected with membership is the sharing of a common ethos, common traditions or culture, such as a common language, a sense of commonality and identification with the rest members of the political community, even a sense of closeness and trust.\textsuperscript{39} This second, mainly sociological element, nevertheless, is highly contested, since the modern societies are becoming more and more multicultural. Furthermore, the exclusive character that membership bears has another counterfeit. It is based in the element of birth and not of the free choice of the individual. Thus the inclusive element of being a member of a certain community at the same time is excluding the individual from his/her ability to seek membership in any other political community of his/her choice.\textsuperscript{40}

The second element of citizenship is connected with the rights and duties of the individual. Citizenship under many theoretical accounts, such as the Marshall’s theory, is seen as the ‘right to have rights’.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, the basis of citizenship on rights is twofold. Thus, rights seen as moral and human right are part of the construction of a collective, national identity. The most characteristic example is the rights acknowledged in the national constitutions. Those rights apart from guaranteeing the liberties and freedoms of the individual are forming the public values which are considered to be the common ground of a nation-state political community, its pactum.


\textsuperscript{40} See Bellamy (2008), pp. 52-53.

societatis. Under this veil, rights are part of the democratic fair play between free, equal citizens and guarantee the just and respectful conditions for their democratic participation in the political decision-making. Additionally, from moral and human rights a secondary form of rights is deriving, namely ‘institutional’ or ‘positive’ rights. Those rights bear a legislative foundation and their value for citizenship is normative and also material, empirical. Those ‘institutional’ rights reflect the realization of ethical and moral values to concrete policies that determine who is a citizen, how one can acquire this identity and what are the rights attached to this status (e.g. The Code of Greek Citizenship as revised on 2010).

The connection between rights and citizenship it is not unproblematic. Firstly, there is an inherent tension between the ability to bear human rights, which belongs to anyone that has a human identity and the enjoyment of rights that identify one as citizen. Thus, in many cases the non-citizens are excluded in the national catalogues of rights of those ones that entail political participation and agency as well as from the general principle of equality. Secondly, problems are generated by the policies adopted for the realization of citizenship mainly those enforcing political participation and representation. Therefore, the ideals of freedom and equality for many are jeopardized by systems of representation that can not guarantee proportional and pluralistic results. On many accounts such systems enhance the internally excluding character of citizenship by functioning for example as a means to strengthen the majority’s rights against the minorities claims. In the end, one must not forget that the very idea of citizenship is closely connected with the willing acceptance of public duties. Our obligations to the political community in which we belong, in fact guarantee our enjoyment of rights. Thus for example, necessary precondition in enjoying the public spaces and property is to abstain from any illegitimate or destructive individual practices. In this relation between rights and duties lays the basic ‘democratic paradox’ of citizenship, since the realization of the rights that the citizens’ identity entails, requires civic cooperation and a common spirit of civic virtue (originated in the Republican model). On the contrary of such an understanding the phenomena of non-participation, political apathy and of the individualistic pursue of self-interests are appearing to be as more and more common in the liberal democracies.

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42 See Bellamy, (2008), p. 15.
The third constitutive element of citizenship is that enables political agency and democratic participation. Political participation is based in the notion of citizenship as ‘right to have rights’ namely political rights. Citizenship draws a distinction between human rights which all even non-citizens can enjoy and political rights which are deemed as privilege of those who are born and thus have the nationality of a nation state. For many, the exclusive character of citizenship lays in this very fact, that political participation and membership are not considered as a human right obtainable for all habitants of a certain political community in spite of their birth and national origin. In this framework, political participation could not be deemed nor as a privilege that a majority bears against a minority, neither as a means to pose internal boundaries to what should be a political community based in humanity and fraternity. In this line, citizenship is not the ‘right to have rights’ but a precondition for holding certain rights that those who are non-citizens can not enjoy. Thus as Ferrajoli points out citizenship is in fact a ‘regressive category because it is a source of inequality.

Under this veil, one should notice that there is a structural difference between the rights that we enjoy as citizens and members of a certain political community and human rights. The first can be deemed as ‘patrimonial’, thus rights that we hold due to our birth, ethnicity and national origin. Those rights do not posses the universal and non-disposable character that human rights have. Instead, they are in many cases disposable (e.g. social and welfare rights), they are depended in the fulfillment of certain obligations that lay with those deemed as citizens (e.g. high taxes, army services) and most importantly they differ form state to state policy (e.g. as state generous in welfare provisions against states who invest on police and army services).

If not their human character, on what basis then, one, a non-citizen could appeal to the enjoyment of ‘patrimonial’ rights? An answer to that question is offered by the cosmopolitan notion of citizenship and the neo-Kantian theorists. Their argument is based in the notion of a universal system of justice originated in international law treaties and declarations binding the nation states in the mutual obligation to equally respect nationals and non-nationals. In this notion, the nation

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state remains the sole sovereign, while the non-citizens acquire the properties and abilities of citizens due to the pre-political rights that a principle of global justice is guaranteeing on their account. The neo-Kantian cosmopolitan approach is emphasizing on a very interesting point. Citizenship should enable the political participation and thus the ability to self-governance and political agency to all habitants of the modern liberal democracies on equal, integrative, inclusive and non-discriminatory terms.

In theory, the three combining elements of citizenship are broadly accepted. Bellamy\textsuperscript{49}, Cohen\textsuperscript{50} and Kymlicka\textsuperscript{51} define citizenship on three basic components: a) as a ‘right to have rights’, the legal status of citizenship in enjoying individual, political and social rights, b) as political participation, self-governance and control over the political institutions and c) the sense of a community based in identity and mutual recognition. Though the political element seems to be the most elaborated, the elements of membership and rights are of equal importance. Thus, is justly observed that belonging is the basis of a strong and coherent political community from a ‘psychological’ and a ‘political’ point of view, since it enhances the sentiments of collective identity and mutual recognition and thus of social integration between the members of community. At the same time, a strong civic identity as forged by the acknowledgment of individual and social rights can be highly motivating for the active and dynamic democratic participation of the citizens.

An excellent definition of citizenship which interconnects the three elements of citizenship is given by Richard Bellamy, according to whom ‘Citizenship is a condition of civic equality. It consists of membership of a political community where all citizens can determine the terms of social cooperation on an equal basis. This status not only secures equal rights to the enjoinderment of collective goods provided by the political association but also involves equal duties to promote and sustain them — including the good of democratic citizenship itself\textsuperscript{52}.

V. The modern challenges on citizenship: multiculturalism, post nationalism and globalization

Nevertheless, all the three elements of citizenship nowadays are presented with counterfeits and impasses. Membership as the ethical basis of a citizenship based

\textsuperscript{49} See Bellamy, (2008).
\textsuperscript{50} See Cohen, (1999).
\textsuperscript{52} See Bellamy (2008), p. 17.
on the community of interests is shuttered in the internally diverse liberal democracies. The question is if it is possible a new common ethos, besides ethnicity and race to replace membership and function as the new ‘glue’ that holds together the liberal democracies. Rights represent the legal aspect of citizenship and they are attacked by the globalized ‘risk’ society, which undermines both the individual freedoms by bringing forward goals such as the protection of public and international security, as well as the social rights which follow the fate of an obscure welfare state. At the same time, political representation is weakened by the augmented incredibility of the political institutions and the lack of accountability and control that globalization and the Postnational frame poses on the citizens of the world. Four theoretical models of citizenship are trying to offer the adequate answers to those dilemmas. The classic model of Universalism as it has been developed by Marshall and its counterpart the Differentiated citizenship approach along with the Multicultural model which is mainly supported by Kymlicka, the liberal Nationalist model as supported by Miller and the Habermas Postnational conception of citizenship. Those approaches have developed in theory along with the very interesting critical feminist theory which sets in its core the role of women in civic life and political participation.

The Universalist model defines citizenship as a right to have rights and thus has a unitary and legal character. This approach is founded on Marshall’s theory and to the integrative character that all three kind of rights bear, the individual, the political and mainly the social rights. In reality, this model adopted to the political and social changes that followed the World Word II and lead to the development of the welfare state in Europe and the USA. The acknowledgment and protection of social rights brought forward a number of policies concerning insurance, employment and health that augmented the sense of solidarity and stability among its members. The social state was closely connected to equality, retribution and justice and it surpassed the internal inclusions that citizenship was formerly connected with, such as gender, class and property, thus promoting social integration. The success of the welfare state functioned as an argument in favor of those theoretical approaches that connected citizenship with the acknowledgment and protection of rights. Nevertheless, this theoretical model declined due to the erosion of the welfare states mainly in the 80’ and because of its inefficacy to fulfill the promised equality and justice for the weaker members of society (e.g. the enduring inequalities and discriminations against the women). In theory this model has been criticized for it its discriminating and majority

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dominant over minorities character by Iris Marion Young, along with its difference-blind character.

A critical reconsideration of this approach underlines the need of Universalism to take into account the political importance of difference in race, gender, ethnicity etc. and thus to include a pluralistic view of the modern liberal democracies and a recognition of the equal political participation of all members of a given society, the majorities as well as the minorities. Under this understanding the pluralistic character of the political system is guaranteeing both the tolerance as well as the recognition of particular minority rights. This approach is also has been criticized in theory. Its main fallacy it is considered to be its inability to insure equality in public deliberation for all participants, both majorities and minorities in order to conduct a dialogue across and beyond their differences. Such a dialogue presupposes that the differentiated participants are open to the ‘other’ and that hierachise social justice as more important than their self interests, conditions that may not appear in real practice. In theory, especially has been criticized the tendency of the Differentiated approach to acknowledge special minority rights thus eroding the common identification, the coercion and common ethos on which the modern liberal democracies should be based on. Addressing this issue, Will Kymlicka has proposed a triple taxonomy of ‘special’ minority rights, thus indicating that only the third category, the self governance rights of minorities can in some cases contravene with the construction of a common societal ethos.

Under the taxonomy proposed by the multicultural approach of Will Kymlicka three forms of inclusion claims can be raised in the modern liberal and differentiated liberal democracies. Firstly, the acknowledgment of special representation rights which are proposed for disadvantaged groups in order to enable them to participate on equal terms in public deliberation. The second refers to the protection of multicultural rights for religious groups and immigrants, enabling them to preserve the basic components of their cultural identity. The third category involves the appointment of self-governance rights to ethnical minorities (e.g. Aboriginal). Those rights are aiming in empowering the minorities in the political offices and institutions. Responding to the criticism against the possibility that by acknowledging such rights in inherently

diverse societies is in fact the factor that is weakening instead of strengthening the common societal bonds, the multicultural approach underlines the initial inexistency of such a community. Instead, it proposes that the specific empowerment of disadvantaged, immigrants and ethnical minorities can enable them to engage in an authentic dialogue with the majorities.

The core characteristic of the Differentiated approach is the emphasis it gives in the relations between rights, individual, political and social and belonging in a political community. Under this veil the enjoyment of rights is the necessary basis for the construction of a common societal and political identity. In theory, this thesis is either connected of disconnected with nationality. Thus, for some theorists the necessary precondition for citizenship to become inclusive is the existence of a common nationality. For others, in order to build this integrating identity what is needed is to surpass the notion of nationality in order to rise above cultural and ethnical differences. In this line of thinking, universal, abstract and general principles are forming a much more comprehensive basis for the synthesis of cultural and ethnic diversity. Thus, according to the liberal Nationalists the sentiment of common civic virtue and its integrative function in Ancient Athens and in Rome is considered to be utopic in the framework of the modern and internally, massive and internally alienated liberal democracies. Instead, as they support, trust, coercion, loyalty and identification can derive from nationality, which thus can become the common bond in an internally fractured political society.  

On the other hand Postnationalists, though they do not doubt the importance of the nation-state in the making of political participation in the modern liberal democracies they claim that sustaining it nowadays is in fact the foundation of an enduring suppression on ethnic cultural minorities as well as of across border imperialism. What they propose is the replacement of nationality and its role in the forming of a common identity by abstract and general universal principles invoking the protection of democracy, human rights, liberty and the rule of law. Those principles as embodied and interpreted in each and one political community form what Jürgen Habermas defines as ‘constitutional patriotism’ a common identity that reflects the political culture, a political awareness completely reattached from the majority culture. Habermas main thesis is that citizenship does not need to be based on a common background ethos, as long as the political participation, deliberation and agency guarantee the social coercion. Procedural democracy and equal participation

59 See Habermas (2001), pp. 73-74, 76.
in political deliberation can result according to this opinion to the generation of a common political culture based on popular sovereignty and political participation. Nevertheless, the association between citizenship and political participation must not lead in the underestimation of cultural and especially social rights which lie in the core of a socially justified and valuable citizenship.

This short account of theoretical approaches on citizenship could not close without a brief reference to the feminist critique on the notion of citizenship. Underlining that the ‘personal is also political’ the feminists express a twofold argument as far as citizenship is concerned. First that citizenship was publicly constructed upon the domestic suppression and exclusion of women in the private realm. Second, they observe that the understanding of citizenship in general is forged in order to fit the ‘masculine qualities’ (e.g. army servitude). As far as the first arguments, the feminist theories employ the principles of justice and equality in order to guarantee that prejudices and participation are surpassed and that women can participate on equal terms as citizens and as members of the political institutions. In the second argument the feminist theory underlines that a feminine ‘reading’ of the notion of citizenship should take place. Nevertheless, the feminist theory as well nowadays focuses on the most crucial dilemma that globalization poses for citizenship: in what ground citizenship can function as a means of rediscovering a common societal ethos, beyond gender, cultural, national and ethnical diversity.

VI. Instead of conclusions: The EU and the promise of a supra and transnational citizenship

Globalization and the challenges it poses to the very idea of the nation state also blur the connection between the citizen and the territory and borders of the traditional nation state. The question as where it is possible or not to acquire a supranational or a transnational citizenship is answered in theory by the Voluntarists who are accounting the fallacies of democracy and justice within the national borders and suggest that we should rethink them beyond them, and the Skeptics who consider such an option as utopic and inconceivable. Their main argument is that though citizenship can function in its legal dimension beyond the nation state

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territory, that is not the case as far as the political participation is concerned. Therefore, democratic control, transparency and accountability as the basic principles of democracy are difficult to be enacted in a global environment\textsuperscript{64}.

A characteristic example is that of the European citizenship, acknowledged by the Maastricht Treaty as a status given to all those that bear the citizenship of member-state of the EU. Thus, the European citizenship is a secondary citizenship depended upon the national recognition of an individual as citizen. European citizenship bears legal and political characteristics, though the latter are considered to be ‘weak’. Indeed, European citizenship can be considered as a right ‘to have rights’ since it is connected with the political participation in the election of the European Parliament as well as with the enjoinderment of rights acknowledged by the EU Treaties as the four economic freedoms (free movement of goods, capital, services an persons) and mainly the rights acknowledged by the Charter of Nice which only currently has acquired binding force with the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon in December of 2009. Nevertheless, European citizenship as far as its political aspect is concerned is considered to be ‘weak’ and undermined by EU’s democratic deficit. Therefore, even the right to participate in the European Parliaments election is considered to be as a ‘second grade’ political right, since its exercise does not ensure the participation of the European citizens in public deliberation on the policies that EU is adopting\textsuperscript{65}. Political participation is also criticized in EU due to the lack of transparency and exercise of the right to information as far as the European citizens are concerned. Indeed as Bellamy points out, ‘European politicians are both little trusted and scarcely known, while electoral turnout is far below that for national elections of the member states and likewise in the decline. By large, citizens have remained tied to their national and subnational allegiances and mainly, and increasingly, view the EU in narrowly self-interested terms’. In this frame what seems that lacks of a European citizenship at most is the construction of a civic or political common ethos.

Regardless of these fallacies, the most interesting asset of the European citizenship is it dual character and the promise that entails. European citizenship is far more than supranational; it is transnational, since a large part of the rights acknowledged by the European legislation is actually enforced in other member states, such as the right to participate in regional election procedures. It is this, the transnational character of European citizenship that promises the most integrating result as far as the European people are concerned, via mainly economical and

\textsuperscript{64} See Leydet (2006).
consequently cultural and social exchange. More importantly, the value of the European citizenship is hiding in the very promise it entails. A promise that citizenship bears an inherently broad content, open to historical and political change and to cultural and national diversity. In the most challenging era of globalization a supra and transnational citizenship can be considered as the ‘ark’ of what is most valued in our liberal democratic nation-states in transition: democracy, justice, equality, rights, diversity and tolerance.
Abstrait (en français)

Une bibliographie pour la citoyenneté : théories et aspects du citoyen moderne

Cet œuvre offre un compte rendu de la citoyenneté, son histoire, sa constitution et aussi ses primordiales approches théoriques. Il est divisé en quatre sections principales. La première examine les deux théories principales de la citoyenneté dans son contexte historique et normatif, c’est-à-dire l’approche républicaine et libérale (de la citoyenneté) comme elles étaient formées dans la tradition grecque ancienne et romane, ainsi que dans sa critique actuelle féministe. La seconde partie met au point les analyses de ce qui semble jusqu’aujourd’hui le travail le plus influent en ce qui concerne la citoyenneté, c’est-à-dire l’œuvre du sociologue britannique, Thomas Humphrey Marshall ‘Citoyenneté et classe sociale’, qui était publié en 1950 et depuis alors se considère comme la base de la littérature internationale concernant la citoyenneté. La troisième partie présente la ‘constitution’ de la citoyenneté, les éléments avec lesquels la notion du citoyen est construite, c’est-à-dire l’adhésion dans une certaine communauté politique, les droits et la capacité de participation démocratique. Enfin, le dernière partie examine l’appréhension moderne de la citoyenneté, son dynamique supranationale, son capacité d’agir comme un moyen d’intégration et coercition dans les démocraties modernes libérales, alors que les théories du pluralisme, cosmopolitisme et post-nationalisme se prennent en considération. Au lieu de conclusion, l’œuvre se termine par un post-scriptum concernant les illusions et perspectives d’une citoyenneté européenne.

Christina M. Akrivopoulou